Daily Papers

How have individuals of social animals in nature evolved to learn from each other, and what would be the optimal strategy for such learning in a specific environment? Here, we address both problems by employing a deep reinforcement learning model to optimize the social learning strategies (SLSs) of agents in a cooperative game in a multi-dimensional landscape. Throughout the training for maximizing the overall payoff, we find that the agent spontaneously learns various concepts of social learning, such as copying, focusing on frequent and well-performing neighbors, self-comparison, and the importance of balancing between individual and social learning, without any explicit guidance or prior knowledge about the system. The SLS from a fully trained agent outperforms all of the traditional, baseline SLSs in terms of mean payoff. We demonstrate the superior performance of the reinforcement learning agent in various environments, including temporally changing environments and real social networks, which also verifies the adaptability of our framework to different social settings.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

An agent holds a position in a perpetual contract with payoff function ψ and attempts to liquidate the position while managing transaction costs, inventory risk, and funding rate payments. By solving the agent's stochastic control problem we obtain a closed-form expression for the optimal trading strategy when the payoff function is given by ψ(s) = s. When the payoff function is non-linear we provide approximations to the optimal strategy which apply when the funding rate parameter is small or when the length of the trading interval is small. We further prove that when ψ is non-linear, the short time approximation can be written in terms of the closed-form trading strategy corresponding to the case of the identity payoff function.

This paper measures hour-of-day effects, filter precision, fragility, and realised yield in a 15-day paper-traded deployment of an autonomous memecoin trading system on Solana decentralised exchanges. The 190-trade sample (March 29 to April 12, 2026) shows a 40.5 percent win rate, mean per-trade return of +0.62 percent, cumulative +117.7 percent (net SOL +0.039), skewness -1.21, excess kurtosis 6.61. A Mann-Whitney U test of three poorest-performing UTC hours (2, 13, 23) against the others yields U = 1,274, p = 0.22; directional but not significant at n = 190. The three hours were selected in-sample, so the comparison is exploratory, not confirmatory. A parallel counterfactual rejection-tracking system collected 4,874 forward-sample observations across 184 distinct rejection events. Of those events, 17.9 percent reached a 50 percent drawdown from reference within 24 hours; 26.0 percent of forward samples recorded the rejected token below half-reference. The filter stack avoided these realised drawdowns: evidence that the rejection criteria are net-positive against forward-market outcomes. Fragility is the principal caveat. Removing the top three trades (1.6 percent of sample) flips cumulative return unprofitable. Profitability rests on a small number of large winners and is structurally fragile. The dataset and audit script are deposited under CC-BY-4.0 (Zenodo DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20043302).

Foreshadowing and payoff are ubiquitous narrative devices through which authors introduce commitments early in a story and resolve them through concrete, observable outcomes. However, despite advances in story generation, large language models (LLMs) frequently fail to bridge these long-range narrative dependencies, often leaving "Chekhov's guns" unfired even when the necessary context is present. Existing evaluations largely overlook this structural failure, focusing on surface-level coherence rather than the logical fulfillment of narrative setups. In this paper, we introduce Codified Foreshadowing-Payoff Generation (CFPG), a novel framework that reframes narrative quality through the lens of payoff realization. Recognizing that LLMs struggle to intuitively grasp the "triggering mechanism" of a foreshadowed event, CFPG transforms narrative continuity into a set of executable causal predicates. By mining and encoding Foreshadow-Trigger-Payoff triples from the BookSum corpus, we provide structured supervision that ensures foreshadowed commitments are not only mentioned but also temporally and logically fulfilled. Experiments demonstrate that CFPG significantly outperforms standard prompting baselines in payoff accuracy and narrative alignment. Our findings suggest that explicitly codifying narrative mechanics is essential for moving LLMs from surface-level fluency to genuine narrative competence.

Language model agents now execute bounded tasks reliably. Whether they can sustain effective decision-making over long horizons, where actions have cumulative consequences and the environment responds to their choices, remains largely unmeasured. FM-Bench (Football Management Benchmark) measures this. An LLM agent runs a football club for 20 in-game years through 26 tools and roughly 340 to 400 decision stops. It drafts a squad on the same budget as every rival, trades players, negotiates contracts, invests in facilities and youth, sets lineups, and answers to a board that can fire it, while a deterministic engine accumulates every year into one final score with no LLM judge or human rater. The solo track plays each of 15 frontier models against a frozen scripted world, and the Arena places the same models plus a scripted anchor in one shared 20-year world; to our knowledge, the first head-to-head evaluation at this scale. We measure six behavioral capabilities behind the score. Across three seeds, all 15 models complete every horizon while the blind scripted baselines die out in most of theirs, and claude-fable-5 tops the solo board on mean score and the Arena, where the title nonetheless rotates among ten models. Neither scale, price, nor vendor predicts the order; the order settles only late in the horizon, and the best first-play human lands only at the bottom of the model board. What separates the models is managerial behavior rather than computation. Higher-scoring models reduce slow-payoff investment near the end, keep cash invested rather than idle, and open renewals well before the deadline, while token spend predicts nothing. No model learns the market's hidden prices from hundreds of rejected bids, and self-managed memory fails in two opposite modes: an archive that only grows or a plan rewritten every season. Code is available at https://github.com/Analogy-AI/fm-bench.

Benchmarks that measure the forecasting ability of large language models are almost always retrospective: the event has happened, the answer is somewhere on the Web, and the evaluation must defend itself against memorisation. We report the opposite design. Over the 39 days of the 2026 FIFA World Cup, six frontier LLMs -- all with extended thinking and native server-side web search -- were asked before every kickoff, one match at a time, to fill in a seven-market prediction card for all 104 matches, plus 12 group winners and a pre-tournament outright pool; no answer existed when the question was asked, so the evaluation is leakage-free by construction rather than by filtering, and the frozen archive holds 4,494 scored predictions. What the tournament establishes is a set of behaviours the six systems share. On match outcome they average 63.9%, level with backing the bookmaker's favourite -- which is in fact what they usually do. They agree with one another far more often than they are right, so a majority vote adds nothing. They under-commit to draws and to goals, and crowd their scoreline picks onto a single prototypical result. Accuracy tracks how lopsided a fixture is rather than how much is known about it: it collapses in the closest ties, where the dossiers are richest, while questions about the tournament as a whole are answered well. On this task the current generation of frontier systems is not sharply differentiated: the standings hold up at the top and the bottom across the run and churn in the middle, and the margins stay narrow throughout. The briefing dossiers, fixtures and official results are released as a benchmark, together with the scoring code.

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.

Expected Goals (xG) has emerged as a popular tool for evaluating finishing skill in soccer analytics. It involves comparing a player's cumulative xG with their actual goal output, where consistent overperformance indicates strong finishing ability. However, the assessment of finishing skill in soccer using xG remains contentious due to players' difficulty in consistently outperforming their cumulative xG. In this paper, we aim to address the limitations and nuances surrounding the evaluation of finishing skill using xG statistics. Specifically, we explore three hypotheses: (1) the deviation between actual and expected goals is an inadequate metric due to the high variance of shot outcomes and limited sample sizes, (2) the inclusion of all shots in cumulative xG calculation may be inappropriate, and (3) xG models contain biases arising from interdependencies in the data that affect skill measurement. We found that sustained overperformance of cumulative xG requires both high shot volumes and exceptional finishing, including all shot types can obscure the finishing ability of proficient strikers, and that there is a persistent bias that makes the actual and expected goals closer for excellent finishers than it really is. Overall, our analysis indicates that we need more nuanced quantitative approaches for investigating a player's finishing ability, which we achieved using a technique from AI fairness to learn an xG model that is calibrated for multiple subgroups of players. As a concrete use case, we show that (1) the standard biased xG model underestimates Messi's GAX by 17% and (2) Messi's GAX is 27% higher than the typical elite high-shot-volume attacker, indicating that Messi is even a more exceptional finisher than people commonly believed.

We describe recent research on the use of actual causality in the definition of responsibility scores as explanations for query answers in databases, and for outcomes from classification models in machine learning. In the case of databases, useful connections with database repairs are illustrated and exploited. Repairs are also used to give a quantitative measure of the consistency of a database. For classification models, the responsibility score is properly extended and illustrated. The efficient computation of Shap-score is also analyzed and discussed. The emphasis is placed on work done by the author and collaborators.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

You are a robot and you live in a Markov decision process (MDP) with a finite or an infinite number of transitions from state-action to next states. You got brains and so you plan before you act. Luckily, your roboparents equipped you with a generative model to do some Monte-Carlo planning. The world is waiting for you and you have no time to waste. You want your planning to be efficient. Sample-efficient. Indeed, you want to exploit the possible structure of the MDP by exploring only a subset of states reachable by following near-optimal policies. You want guarantees on sample complexity that depend on a measure of the quantity of near-optimal states. You want something, that is an extension of Monte-Carlo sampling (for estimating an expectation) to problems that alternate maximization (over actions) and expectation (over next states). But you do not want to StOP with exponential running time, you want something simple to implement and computationally efficient. You want it all and you want it now. You want TrailBlazer.

We consider identification of average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) within the difference-in-differences (DiD) framework in the presence of endogenous sample selection. First, we establish that the usual DiD estimand fails to recover meaningful treatment effects, even if selection and treatment assignment are independent. Next, we partially identify the ATT for individuals who are always observed post-treatment regardless of their treatment status, and derive bounds on this parameter under different sets of assumptions about the relationship between sample selection and treatment assignment. Extensions to the repeated cross-section and two-by-two comparisons in the staggered adoption case are explored. Furthermore, we provide identification results for the ATT of three additional empirically relevant latent groups by incorporating outcome mean dominance assumptions which have intuitive appeal in applications. Finally, two empirical illustrations demonstrate the approach's usefulness by revisiting (i) the effect of a job training program on earnings(Calonico & Smith, 2017) and (ii) the effect of a working-from-home policy on employee performance (Bloom, Liang, Roberts, & Ying, 2015).

The performance of trend following strategies can be ascribed to the difference between long-term and short-term realized variance. We revisit this general result and show that it holds for various definitions of trend strategies. This explains the positive convexity of the aggregate performance of Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) which -- when adequately measured -- turns out to be much stronger than anticipated. We also highlight interesting connections with so-called Risk Parity portfolios. Finally, we propose a new portfolio of strangle options that provides a pure exposure to the long-term variance of the underlying, offering yet another viewpoint on the link between trend and volatility.

The proper design and architecture of testing of machine learning models, especially in their application to quantitative finance problems, is crucial. The most important in this process is selecting an adequate loss function used for training, validation, estimation purposes, and tuning of hyperparameters. Therefore, in this research, through empirical experiments on equity and cryptocurrency assets, we introduce the Mean Absolute Directional Loss (MADL) function which is more adequate for optimizing forecast-generating models used in algorithmic investment strategies. The MADL function results are compared for Transformer and LSTM models and we show that almost in every case Transformer results are significantly better than those obtained with LSTM.

Portfolio optimization has been an area that has attracted considerable attention from the financial research community. Designing a profitable portfolio is a challenging task involving precise forecasting of future stock returns and risks. This chapter presents a comparative study of three portfolio design approaches, the mean-variance portfolio (MVP), hierarchical risk parity (HRP)-based portfolio, and autoencoder-based portfolio. These three approaches to portfolio design are applied to the historical prices of stocks chosen from ten thematic sectors listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India. The portfolios are designed using the stock price data from January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2021, and their performances are tested on the out-of-sample data from January 1, 2022, to December 31, 2022. Extensive results are analyzed on the performance of the portfolios. It is observed that the performance of the MVP portfolio is the best on the out-of-sample data for the risk-adjusted returns. However, the autoencoder portfolios outperformed their counterparts on annual returns.

Designing an optimum portfolio that allocates weights to its constituent stocks in a way that achieves the best trade-off between the return and the risk is a challenging research problem. The classical mean-variance theory of portfolio proposed by Markowitz is found to perform sub-optimally on the real-world stock market data since the error in estimation for the expected returns adversely affects the performance of the portfolio. This paper presents three approaches to portfolio design, viz, the minimum risk portfolio, the optimum risk portfolio, and the Eigen portfolio, for seven important sectors of the Indian stock market. The daily historical prices of the stocks are scraped from Yahoo Finance website from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2020. Three portfolios are built for each of the seven sectors chosen for this study, and the portfolios are analyzed on the training data based on several metrics such as annualized return and risk, weights assigned to the constituent stocks, the correlation heatmaps, and the principal components of the Eigen portfolios. Finally, the optimum risk portfolios and the Eigen portfolios for all sectors are tested on their return over a period of a six-month period. The performances of the portfolios are compared and the portfolio yielding the higher return for each sector is identified.

We introduce Crypto Accounting Bench (CAB), a benchmark for assessing whether frontier and open-weight language models can reconstruct the complete journal entry that an organization actually posted for a crypto-asset transaction. CAB contains 118 evaluation tasks drawn from 7 pseudonymized organizations. Each task combines transaction mechanics, asset quantities and base-currency values, wallet and legal-entity context, counterparty evidence, related transaction legs, recurrence, tax-lot evidence, and the organization's complete chart of accounts. The target is a balanced structured entry with every required account, side, amount, currency, and full-precision asset quantity. We evaluate 12 models spanning proprietary frontier systems and open-weight releases over 3 independent attempts per task, producing 4,248 trajectories. We report 3 metrics: Mean Score, Best@3, and Pass@3. Pass@3 is the fraction of tasks with at least 1 of 3 attempts that satisfies every rubric criterion and required gate. The leading model reaches 77.43% Mean Score, while the best Pass@3 is 56.78%. Deterministic diagnostics, read from each task's best of 3 attempts and macro-averaged across the 12 models, show higher base-amount agreement (97.8%) than deciding-account accuracy (56.3%). Together with the failure analysis, these results identify account selection and complete-entry composition as the main remaining challenges on CAB.

The game show Lucky 13 differs from other television game shows in that contestants are required to place a bet on their own knowledge of trivia by selecting a range that contains the number of questions that they answered correctly. We present a model for this game show using binomial random variables and generate tables outlining the optimal range the player should select based on maximization of two different utility functions. After analyzing the decisions made by some actual contestants on this show, we present a numerical simulation for how many questions an average player is expected to answer correctly based on question categories observed for two sample contestants.

We placed 100 memory-equipped large language model (LLM) agents in charge of a closed, money-conserving spatial economy on real Pokhara Lakeside geography (earning wages, running businesses, setting prices) and ran this multi-agent simulation for up to 26 simulated weeks, well past the 1-2 weeks typical of agent-society studies. Across 91 validated runs (2.44M agent decisions, 21.5B tokens), the money stops moving, in a specific and measurable way. A 12x tourist demand shock raises business revenue 4.62x (p<0.001), which we decompose exactly into a 1.50x extensive margin (more businesses trading) and a 3.07x intensive margin (more revenue each). Monetary transmission stops there. Wages move 1.03x (p=0.42); 0.3% of 3,981 menu items are ever repriced (p=0.47). A randomized cash transfer (NPR 5,000 to 20 of 100 agents) shows the same pattern from the opposite direction: 96.7% is still held 311 pulses later, marginal propensity to consume 3-4% by two independent measures, indistinguishable from zero. The wealth distribution is consequently near-frozen at the horizon this literature uses (ρ=0.964 over 2 simulated weeks), but not frozen. ρ falls to 0.832 at 12 weeks and 0.752 at 26, a horizon-dependence no short study can see. Matched ablations show which knob actually matters. Swapping the backing LLM moves every outcome we measure (p=0.0039); deleting agents' memory moves none of them detectably. A purely social tool fails 94-97% of the time across two model families, compared with ~96% success on economic tools, with no measurable shift away from it. Every headline number is verified twice, by a live validator and by an offline recomputation that reconciles each agent's wealth against its own signed transaction history, and we release the full run corpus for reanalysis.

In this paper we pursue the question of a fully online trading algorithm (i.e. one that does not need offline training on previously gathered data). For this task we use Double Deep Q-learning in the episodic setting with Fast Learning Networks approximating the expected reward Q. Additionally, we define the possible terminal states of an episode in such a way as to introduce a mechanism to conserve some of the money in the trading pool when market conditions are seen as unfavourable. Some of these money are taken as profit and some are reused at a later time according to certain criteria. After describing the algorithm, we test it using the 1-minute-tick data for Cardano's price on Binance. We see that the agent performs better than trading with randomly chosen actions on each timestep. And it does so when tested on the whole dataset as well as on different subsets, capturing different market trends.

We present Coopetition-Gym v1, a benchmark platform for mixed-motive multi-agent reinforcement learning under strategic coopetition. The platform comprises twenty environments organized into four mechanism classes that correspond to four foundational technical reports: interdependence and complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802), trust and reputation dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909), collective action and loyalty (arXiv:2601.16237), and sequential interaction and reciprocity (arXiv:2604.01240). Each environment carries a closed-form payoff structure and a calibrated interdependence matrix derived from the corresponding report. Every environment exposes a parameterized reward layer configurable across three structurally distinct modes (private, integrated, cooperative). This separation of payoff from reward enables reward-type ablation, the platform's principal methodological apparatus. Four of the twenty environments are calibrated against historically documented coopetitive relationships and reproduce their outcomes at 98.3, 81.7, 86.7, and 87.3 percent on the validation rubric (Samsung-Sony LCD, Renault-Nissan Alliance, Apache HTTP Server, Apple iOS App Store). The platform exposes Gymnasium, PettingZoo Parallel, and PettingZoo AEC interfaces and ships 126 reference algorithms: 16 learning algorithms, 7 game-theoretic oracles, 2 heuristic baselines, and 101 constant-action policies. A reference experimental study trained the 16 learning algorithms on every environment under every reward configuration with seven random seeds, producing a 25,708-run training corpus and a 1,116-run behavioral audit corpus, both released under CC-BY-4.0 with Croissant 1.0 metadata. Coopetition-Gym v1 is the first platform to combine continuous-action mixed-motive environments, parameterized reward mutuality, calibrated interdependence coefficients, game-theoretic oracle baselines, and validated case studies.