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Jul 29

InTAR: Inter-Task Auto-Reconfigurable Accelerator Design for High Data Volume Variation in DNNs

The rise of deep neural networks (DNNs) has driven an increased demand for computing power and memory. Modern DNNs exhibit high data volume variation (HDV) across tasks, which poses challenges for FPGA acceleration: conventional accelerators rely on fixed execution patterns (dataflow or sequential) that can lead to pipeline stalls or necessitate frequent off-chip memory accesses. To address these challenges, we introduce the Inter-Task Auto-Reconfigurable Accelerator (InTAR), a novel accelerator design methodology for HDV applications on FPGAs. InTAR combines the high computational efficiency of sequential execution with the reduced off-chip memory overhead of dataflow execution. It switches execution patterns automatically with a static schedule determined before circuit design based on resource constraints and problem sizes. Unlike previous reconfigurable accelerators, InTAR encodes reconfiguration schedules during circuit design, allowing model-specific optimizations that allocate only the necessary logic and interconnects. Thus, InTAR achieves a high clock frequency with fewer resources and low reconfiguration time. Furthermore, InTAR supports high-level tools such as HLS for fast design generation. We implement a set of multi-task HDV DNN kernels using InTAR. Compared with dataflow and sequential accelerators, InTAR exhibits 1.8times and 7.1 times speedups correspondingly. Moreover, we extend InTAR to GPT-2 medium as a more complex example, which is 3.65 sim 39.14times faster and a 1.72 sim 10.44times more DSP efficient than SoTA accelerators (Allo and DFX) on FPGAs. Additionally, this design demonstrates 1.66 sim 7.17times better power efficiency than GPUs. Code: https://github.com/OswaldHe/InTAR

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 12, 2025

Probe-Geometry Alignment: Erasing the Cross-Sequence Memorization Signature Below Chance

Recent attacks show that behavioural unlearning of large language models leaves internal traces recoverable by adversarial probes. We characterise where this retention lives and show it can be surgically removed without measurable capability cost. Our central protocol is a leave-one-out cross-sequence probe that tests whether a memorisation signature generalises across held-out sequences. The signature is real and consistent across scale: memorisation-specific gaps of +0.32, +0.19, +0.30 on Pythia-70M, GPT-2 medium, and Mistral-7B; on Pythia-70M, the random-initialisation control collapses to -0.04 at the deepest layer where the pretrained signature peaks. The probe direction is causally separable from recall -- projecting it out collapses the signature locally (+0.44 -> -0.19) while behavioural recall barely changes -- and a probe trained on naturally memorised content does not classify fine-tuning-injected secrets, marking two representationally distinct regimes. We then introduce probe-geometry alignment (PGA), a surgical erasure that aligns activations along the probe's live readout direction at each depth. PGA drives the cross-sequence probe below random chance at all four scales tested (toy depth-4: 0.17; Pythia-70M: 0.07; Mistral-7B: 0.45; GPT-2 medium: 0.06 via MD-PGA k=2) and remains robust to six adversarial probe variants. Against a re-fitting attacker who trains a fresh probe on PGA-treated activations, we extend PGA adversarially, defeating the re-fit probe at every memorisation-relevant depth while preserving five zero-shot capability benchmarks within 2.8 percentage points per task (mean Δacc = +0.2pp). The cross-sequence signature is a real, causally separable, regime-specific property of pretrained representations -- removable below chance with a single rank-one intervention per depth at no measurable capability cost.

  • 2 authors
·
May 5

Contrastive Search Is What You Need For Neural Text Generation

Generating text with autoregressive language models (LMs) is of great importance to many natural language processing (NLP) applications. Previous solutions for this task often produce text that contains degenerative expressions or lacks semantic consistency. Recently, Su et al. introduced a new decoding method, contrastive search, based on the isotropic representation space of the language model and obtained new state of the art on various benchmarks. Additionally, Su et al. argued that the representations of autoregressive LMs (e.g. GPT-2) are intrinsically anisotropic which is also shared by previous studies. Therefore, to ensure the language model follows an isotropic distribution, Su et al. proposed a contrastive learning scheme, SimCTG, which calibrates the language model's representations through additional training. In this study, we first answer the question: "Are autoregressive LMs really anisotropic?". To this end, we extensively evaluate the isotropy of LMs across 16 major languages. Surprisingly, we find that the anisotropic problem only exists in the two specific English GPT-2-small/medium models. On the other hand, all other evaluated LMs are naturally isotropic which is in contrast to the conclusion drawn by previous studies. Based on our findings, we further assess the contrastive search decoding method using off-the-shelf LMs on four generation tasks across 16 languages. Our experimental results demonstrate that contrastive search significantly outperforms previous decoding methods without any additional training. More notably, on 12 out of the 16 evaluated languages, contrastive search performs comparably with human-level performances as judged by human evaluations. Our code and other related resources are publicly available at https://github.com/yxuansu/Contrastive_Search_Is_What_You_Need.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 25, 2022

Rift: A Conflict Signature for Deception in Language Models

A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p~6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p~1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 14